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Testing a point (sharp) null hypothesis is arguably the most widely used statistical 
inferential procedure in many fields of scientific research, nevertheless, the most 
controversial, and misapprehended. Since 1935 when Buchanan-Wollaston raised the 
first criticism against hypothesis testing, this foundational field of statistics has drawn 
increasingly active and stronger opposition, including draconian suggestions that 
statistical significance testing should be abandoned or even banned. Statisticians should 
stop ignoring these accumulated and significant anomalies within the current point-null 
hypotheses paradigm and rebuild healthy foundations of statistical science. The 
foundation for a paradigm shift in testing statistical hypotheses is suggested, which is 
testing interval null hypotheses based on implications of the Zero probability paradox. It 
states that in a real-world research point-null hypothesis of a normal mean has zero 
probability. This implies that formulated point-null hypothesis of a mean in the context of 
the simple normal model is almost surely false. Thus, Zero probability paradox points to 
the root cause of so-called large n problem in significance testing. It discloses that there is 
no point in searching for a cure under the current point-null paradigm. 
 
Keywords: zero-probability paradox, point null hypothesis, Lebesgue measure, 
rational numbers, algebraic numbers, almost sure false null hypothesis, inexactification, 
paradigm shift in testing statistical hypotheses. 
 
 
 
“It cannot be denied that, during the recent rapid development 
of practical methods, fundamental problems have been ignored 
and fundamental paradoxes left unresolved” 
Fisher (1922) 
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Introduction 
Following Fisher’s foundational contribution to significance tests, and Neyman 
and Pearson to hypothesis tests, statistical testing has become widely adopted by 
researchers as the most common statistical inferential approach in almost all 
different branches of science. However, there has been a steadily growing 
dissatisfaction in the scientific community with traditional tests of the point (sharp, 
precise) null hypothesis. Since Buchanan-Wollaston (1935) raised the first 
criticism against significance testing, their application has been debated 
extensively, and numerous objections and severe complaints have been leveled 
against their utility. Critics also accentuated statistical tests are not only overused, 
but are often misunderstood and misused. Nickerson (2000) provided a summary 
of common misconceptions, and criticisms as well as arguments in support of null 
hypothesis testing, from a non-statistician viewpoint.  
The most trenchant critics requested significance tests should be abandoned, 
banned or deinstitutionalized (e.g., Lindley, 1975; Hunter, 1997; Armstrong, 
2007; Orlitzky, 2012). The editors of the American Journal of Public Health 
imposed a ban, although it only lasted two years. Similarly, in 1997 the officers of 
the American Psychological Association (APA) created a task force to make 
recommendations about appropriate statistical practice and to consider banning 
significance testing. The proposal was regarded as too extreme and was rejected 
(Wilkinson, 1999). More recently, in 2015, the editors of Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology journal enforced a ban on significance testing (as well as 
confidence intervals). On behalf of the ASA Board of Directors, Wasserstein & 
Lazar (2016) formulated six principles regarding the usage of p-values, hoping 
that the ASA statement would open a fresh discussion with regards to the use of 
statistical inference. 
The ASA’s statement should be praised as the first organized reply from 
statistics community to the abovementioned issues. However, it did not address 
the fundamental problems and did not provide a new perspective on statistical 
testing. 
Critics advocated reform of statistical inference and statistics education. 
They recommended less emphasis should be placed on reporting of p values, 
cynically termed “harvest of asterisks” (Cohen, 1990). The reformers, mainly 
non-statisticians, argued attention should be shifted to effect size, point estimation, 
confidence interval, information theoretic approaches (e.g., Akaike Information 
Criterion), graphical methods, and progressively more on the communication of 
results using Bayesian inference. 
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Consider two of the most important criticisms of significance testing: (1) 
point null hypotheses are unlikely to be true, and (2) a statistical significant result 
is always obtainable with a sufficiently large sample. The scope of this paper is 
limited to the problem of testing the mean of a normal distribution, although this 
problem is of substantial importance because of its widespread application in 
statistical theory and practice. The primary objective is to prove that in the real-
world research when testing the mean of a normal distribution using a point-null 
hypothesis, the probability of that hypothesis is zero. We call this result the Zero 
probability paradox. This paradox undoubtedly reveals logical deficiency of a 
point-null hypothesis of a normal mean: in reality, its testing is actually a 
procedure that unequivocally will lead (with sufficiently large sample) to a 
foregone conclusion that formulated null hypothesis is almost surely false. The 
logical name for this procedure in which a sharp null hypothesis is ultimately 
being rejected should be “inexactification,” rather than testing (Good, 1994, p. 
241). 
The Existence of Point Null Hypothesis: History and 
Overview 
Testing a point null hypothesis is arguably the most widely used and at the same 
time the most controversial, misapprehended and severely criticized statistical 
procedure in many fields of scientific research. Focus on one of the most common 
criticisms, that point null hypotheses are not realistic. The Zero probability 
paradox, presented here, evolved as a result of persuasive and accumulated ideas 
of statisticians, and non-statisticians referred to in this section.  
There is a vast amount of references in statistics and non-statistics literature 
with the claim that, in reality, point null hypotheses are almost always false. 
Critics, however, supported this statement only by intuitive arguments, empirical 
evidence, and common sense. One of the early critics, L. J. Savage (1954, p. 254), 
disproved the validity of tests “in which the null hypothesis is such that it would 
not really be accepted by anyone.” I. R. Savage, (1957, p. 332-333) asserted the 
“null hypotheses of no difference are usually known to be false before the data are 
collected…when they are, their rejection or acceptance simply reflects the size of 
the sample and the power of the test, and is not a contribution to science.” 
Nunnally (1960, p. 642) expressed a similar assertion, but admitted he agreed 
although he cannot prove it directly. However, he argued it is supported both by 
common sense and by practical experience. Likewise, Meehl, (1967, p. 108) 
pointed out there is “universal agreement that the old point-null hypothesis…is 
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[quasi-] always false in biological and social science.” His opinion was based on 
the result that in “psychological and sociological investigations involving very 
large numbers of subjects, it is regularly found that almost all correlations or 
differences between means are statistically significant” (p. 109). Meehl illustrated 
this by providing an example of a large sample of over 55,000 Minnesota high 
school seniors that revealed 91% significant associations among a collection of 45 
variables.  
In the same way, Cohen (1990, p. 1308) stated the null hypothesis “taken 
literally (and that's the only way you can take it in formal hypothesis testing), is 
always false in the real world. It can only be true in the bowels of a computer 
processor running a Monte Carlo study (and even then a stray electron may make 
it false).  If it is false, even to a tiny degree, it must be the case that a large enough 
sample will produce a significant result and lead to its rejection. So if the null is 
always false, what’s the big deal about rejecting it?"  
There is near consensus in the literature that exactly true point null 
hypotheses are extremely rare in reality. This is exemplified by the following by 
Kadane (1987, p. 347): “For the last 15 or so years I have been looking for 
applied cases in which I might have some serious belief in a null hypothesis. In 
that time I found only one [testing an astrologer claim that on the bases of peoples 
birthdays it is possible to predict who is likely to have a drug problem]... I do not 
expect to test a precise hypothesis as a serious statistical calculation.”  
In a similar manner, there was a quest for an existence of a realistic case for 
which a null hypothesis cannot be regarded beforehand as false.  As a result of 
this pursuit, a commonly given example is found, that there is no extrasensory 
effect in a parapsychological experiment. Good (1994, p. 241) argued there is at 
least one example of a precisely sharp null hypothesis: precognition is impossible. 
Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2006, p. 45) suggested astrology cannot predict the future. 
Berger and Delampady (1987, p. 320), although admitting that it is perhaps 
impossible to have a null hypothesis that can be exactly modeled as θ = θ0, noted 
talking to plants has no effect on their growth. Nevertheless, they admitted minor 
biases in the design of the experiments may produce statistical significance. They 
also argued that point null hypotheses are reasonable approximations to fuzzy 
precise (small interval) nulls. However, as pointed out by Bernardo (1999, p. 102) 
“this approximation always breaks down for sufficiently large samples.” Likewise, 
Rousseau (2007) showed for large samples the Bayes factor associated with point 
null hypotheses is a poor approximation of Bayes factors of interval null 
hypotheses unless the intervals are extremely small. 
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In contrast, Zellner (1987, p. 339) emphasized many realistic examples of 
point null hypotheses can be given in testing well-formulated physical laws, such 
as s =. 5gt2 and E = mc2. Kass and Raftery (1995, p. 788) argued although “one 
rarely believes a scientific law in an absolute sense, it is a great convenience to 
speak and to act as if laws are valid. When one says that a certain theory is correct, 
one means that deviations from it are sufficiently minor to be irrelevant for all 
practical purposes at hand.” 
Based on the above arguments, a natural question arises: why are we testing 
point null hypotheses at all, when it is known in advance they are almost never 
exactly true in the real world? Sprenger (2013) argued these hypotheses often give 
useful idealization of reality. He considered this originated in the Popperian 
philosophy of science: “only a highly testable or improbable theory is worth 
testing and is actually (and not only potentially) satisfactory if it withstands severe 
tests.” (Popper, 1963, p. 219–220)  
According to Cox (2006, p. 31) null hypothesis refers to a probability model, 
and this implies idealization. He argued it would be absurd to think that a 
mathematical model could be an exact representation of a real system. Thus, null 
hypotheses are postulated within a system that is untrue. 
Good (1956, p. 254) remarked a null hypothesis is tested, although it is 
known in advance it cannot be exactly true, because “we wish to test whether the 
hypothesis is in some sense approximately true, or whether it is rejectable on the 
sort of size of sample that we intend to take.” Kruskal (1968) indicated the need is 
to test whether the mean is near µ0, meaning as near as makes no substantive 
difference. He stated this will be achieved as long as the sample sizes and 
significance levels are reasonable and the power is at least moderately large for 
alternatives interestingly different from the null hypothesis. 
Edwards, et al. (1963) presented a Bayesian view on the sharp null 
hypothesis problem. They acknowledged in usual applications the null hypothesis 
is known to be false from the outset, because realistically the null hypothesis 
cannot be infinitely sharp. From a Bayesian perspective, a sharp null hypothesis is 
likely to be appropriate only when it deserves special initial credence. They also 
highlighted in Bayesian analysis the null hypothesis is “a hazily defined small 
region rather than a point [italicized by authors]” (p. 235).  
Finally, consider Krueger’s (2001) attempt to explain why all null 
hypotheses are false. He started from the premise that in statistics populations are 
mathematical abstractions that contain infinite possible observations. “This 
implies an infinite number of possible states of the population, and each of these 
states may be a distinct hypothesis. With an infinite number of hypotheses, no 
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individual hypothesis can be true with any calculable probability” (p. 17). It is, 
however, clear that his arguments on the survival of the flawed significance 
testing are themselves flawed. It is erroneous to claim that one-sided and interval 
null hypotheses are always false. 
It can be concluded existing literature does not offer proof of the 
extraordinary statement that all point null hypotheses are false. 
The Nature of a Point Null Hypothesis 
Before exposing the Zero probability paradox, it is of fundamental importance to 
clarify some misconceptions about the nature of the point null hypothesis. 
Suppose that a random sample of size n, X = (X1, X2, …, Xn), is selected 
from the normal population N(θ, σ2), where θ is an unknown mean assuming 
values in a parameter space Θ   1 . Suppose also that the variance, σ2 > 0 is 
known. It is required to test the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 versus an unspecified 
alternative hypothesis H1 : θ ≠ θ0. Regard this sharp or point null hypothesis as a 
numerically exact statement, that is free of vagueness and ambiguity, namely as 
an assertion that exactly specifies a single value of a parameter θ0. In other words, 
it is obvious that θ0 as a crisp number, not a fuzzy number. 
It is well known that to every real number there corresponds a unique point 
on the number line and vice versa. Obviously, point hypothetical value θ0 
corresponds to a distinctive point on the real number line, not to an interval. As 
Euclid gave an intuitive definition in the first sentence from his Elements book 1, 
“a point is that which has no part, or which has no magnitude.” In the 
contemporary notion, this is tantamount to saying that a point is a dimensionless 
entity that has only a location. It also naturally implies that “every point is 
unextended” (Playfair, 1819, p. 289). 
Claims that there are different kinds of sharp hypotheses, some fuzzy sharp 
and some infinitely sharp, in other words, that equal sign can be perceived in 
infinitely different ways, are unconvincing. If testing “hazily defined small region” 
is considered a null hypothesis in a scientific, non-subjective way, then it is a sine 
qua non to formulate that hypothesis accurately, for example, as H0 :|θ – θ0| ≤ δ or 
using fuzzy set theory as 0 0:H   , where   is the unknown fuzzy parameter 
and 0  a known fuzzy number. However, in the traditional point null hypothesis 
H0 : θ = θ0, in practice, (since the pioneering work of Arbuthnott (1710)) θ0 has 
always been formulated as a crisp rational number, never as a fuzzy number  . 
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A fuzzy number,  , in contrast, is a distinctly different entity. It is defined 
as a fuzzy set in  with a normal, fuzzy convex and a continuous membership 
function of bounded support. Note also that, in the fuzzy set framework, the 
possible values of the parameter of interest are expressed as linguistic variables, 
and that the data are observations of a normal fuzzy random sample. In conclusion, 
0 0  , that is, (Crisp number = Fuzzy number), is nothing else but a self-
deception. 
Zero Probability Paradox 
In a real-world research, the probability of an exact point-null hypothesis of the 
mean of a normally distributed population is zero. Let  be the set of all rational 
real numbers, that is  / ; , , 0m n m n n   , where  stands for the set of all 
integers. Suppose, as in the previous section, that a random sample of size n, 
X = (X1, X2, …, Xn), is selected from the normal population N(θ, σ2), where θ is an 
unknown mean assuming values in a parameter space Θ 1 . Divide parameter 
space into two disjoints sets   and \  that are mutually exclusive 
( \   ) and exhaustive ( \  ). Suppose further that the set 
  is equivalent to the set of all rational numbers  and that \  is equivalent 
to the set of all irrational numbers \ . 
It is desired to test the traditional null hypothesis 
 
 
0 0:H     (1) 
 
versus an unspecified alternative hypothesis 
 
 1 0:H   , 
 
where θ0 is a rational number, i.e. 0   
. 
Point-null zero probability paradox (Zero Probability paradox). 
Probability of the null hypothesis (1) is equal to zero: 
 
  0 | 0P H    .  
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This is tantamount to saying that probability of the null hypothesis 
 
 
  
  
0
1
| All rational numbers 0,  and
| All irrational numbers 1.
P H
P H


 
 
  
 
Here, regard rationals on the number line as indicators of the means of 
corresponding normal distributions that have rational numbers as their means. 
 
Proof: 
 
A) In scientific research and statistical practice, any point null 
hypothesis of the normal population is almost always stated as a 
single rational number. 
B) As proved by Cantor in 1873, rational numbers are countable—that 
is, there is in one-one correspondence between the rational numbers 
and the natural numbers (see, for example, Calkin and Wilf, 2000, 
for a binary tree argument). Because the rational numbers, qi, are 
countable, enumerate them as a sequence {qi}, or  1i iq

 . 
Hence, the set of all hypothetical null values of the point-null 
hypotheses that could be expressed using rational numbers,  , is 
also countable. In other words, this set has a bijective 
correspondence to the set of rational numbers. 
C) The Lebesgue measure of any singleton set, {x}, is zero (where 
singleton means the smallest possible nonempty set). Every 
countable set has Lebesgue measure zero (see, for example, Adams 
and Guillemin, 1996, p. 9). Therefore, Lebesgue measure of the set 
of all rational numbers is also zero, that is 
      1
1
0i i i
i
q q  




   . 
In light of this fact, Lebesgue measure of the set of all 
hypothetical null values of the point-null hypotheses that could be 
expressed using rational numbers ( 0 :H   ) is also zero because 
this set is countable, λ( ) = 0. 
D) Normal distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the 
Lebesgue measure λ. This signifies that all sets which have zero 
Lebesgue measure must also have zero probability under probability 
TESTING POINT NULL HYPOTHESIS OF A NORMAL MEAN  
10 
measure; i.e., for all events AR such that µ(A) = 0 → PX(A) = 0. 
As Borovkov (2013, p. 39) has nicely exemplified “for an absolutely 
continuous distribution, the probability of hitting a set of zero 
Lebesgue measure is zero.” 
E) Because for an absolutely continuous distribution, a countably 
infinite set of all rational numbers has Lebesgue measure zero, 
conclude their probability measure is also zero. 
F) Therefore, probability measure of a set of all possible hypothetical 
null rational values of the point-null hypotheses in testing a normal 
mean is also zero,   0 | 0P H    . This unequivocally 
amounts to the deduction that any single-point null hypothesis about 
the normal mean has also probability zero, that is, 
 
P(Point-null hypothesis formulated as a rational number | Normal 
distribution) = 0. 
 
Quod erat demonstrandum. 
 
Subsequently, the probability of point null formulated as an irrational 
number is one. Figuratively speaking, rationals occupy zero length on a real line 
and the set of irrationals is uncountably infinite. 
The scope of the Zero probability paradox can be further extended to the 
even more general set of all point null hypotheses asserted as real algebraic 
numbers, that is, the roots of single variable polynomial equations whose 
coefficients are all integers. This set includes rational numbers, Gaussian integers, 
golden ratio, constructible numbers, some irrational numbers such as √3, etc. 
Because this set is countable, as also proved by Cantor in 1874, (see, for example, 
Kaplansky, 2001, Paradox 4, p. 23) it has Lebesgue measure zero and therefore 
under Gaussian distribution its probability is zero. The cardinality (a measure of 
the "number of elements of the set") of the algebraic numbers is א0 (aleph-naught), 
the same as the natural numbers and rational numbers. However, the cardinality of 
the set of transcendental numbers is the same as that of the set of real numbers 
, the cardinality of the continuum. Almost all real numbers are transcendental, 
but we are familiar with almost none of them (except, for example, π, e, Liouville 
numbers, Champernowne constant, etc.). 
It is important to emphasize that the Zero probability paradox applies both 
in the case when population variance is known and unknown. 
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It might be objected that a point-null hypothesis that the mean of the errors 
made in astronomical observations is equal to zero is reasonable and that its 
probability could be larger than zero. Karl Pearson (1935a, p. 296) replied, “I 
have never found a normal curve fit anything if there are enough observations! 
The astronomical data provided to prove that errors of observation follow normal 
curves are pitiably scanty, and if proper tests are applied usually show that they 
do not!” 
Conclusion 
Zero Probability and Impossibility.  
Before discussing some of the implications of the Zero probability paradox, it is 
of considerable interest to clarify the difference between zero probability and 
impossibility. The most common and persistent misconception in the literature 
about probability is the interpretation that zero probability implies that an event is 
impossible. This is equally shared by many applied statistics textbooks writers 
(for example, Everitt, 1999, p. 14; de Muth, 2014, p. 20; Burns & Burns, 2008, p. 
164; Sharma, 2010, p. 191) and non-statisticians (for example, Poole & 
Mackworth, 2010, p. 296; Finlayson & McMahon, 2004, p. 360; Yoe, 2012, p. 
305; Quinn and Keough, 2002, p. 7). This does not come as a surprise since many 
notable scholars held the same false impression in the past.  
As reported by Finetti (2008, p. 49), Borel used to say “let us consider the 
probabilities 10-3, 10-10, 10-100, 10-1000. A probability of 10-1000 is roughly equal to 
the probability of picking by chance a particular atom in the entire universe.” 
Indeed, Borel (1962, p. 3), one of the founding fathers of measure theory, 
proposed in a book for the non-scientists published in 1943 “the single law of 
chance,” or Borel’s law. It states “Events with a sufficiently small probability 
never occur; or at least, we must act, in all circumstances, as if they were 
impossible.” Similar interpretations were given by many other eminent scientists 
who tried to relate probabilities to the physical world. For example, Bernoulli 
(1713, pp. 211-212) stated in the first chapter of Part IV of his Ars Conjectandi 
that “if one thing is considered morally certain which has 999/1000 certainty, 
another thing will be morally impossible, which has only 1/1000 certainty.” 
Cournot (1843, p. 78) also tried to build a bridge from probability theory to the 
physical world by stating that “a physically impossible event is one whose 
probability is infinitely small.” Likewise, Popper (2002, p. 195) pointed out that 
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“the rule that extreme improbabilities have to be neglected…agrees with the 
demand for scientific objectivity.”  
However, today, there is an almost general agreement among statisticians 
that probability zero means “almost surely impossible” or extremely unlikely. In 
other words, an event of zero probability will almost never happen but there may 
be exceptions. For example, Kolmogorov (1956, p. 5) emphasized that “P(A) = 0 
does not imply the impossibility of A…all we can assert is that…event A is 
practically impossible.” According to Hand (2014, p. 6), “extremely improbable 
events are commonplace. It’s a consequence of more fundamental laws, which all 
tie together to lead inevitably and inexorably to the occurrence of such 
extraordinarily unlikely events.” Although we approve of Hand’s position that 
events of vanishingly small probability will ultimately happen, we strongly 
disagree with establishing statistical tests on point-null hypotheses and expecting 
for coincidences and miracles to happen. 
In light of the previous discussion, we restate the Zero probability paradox 
in the following, more comprehensible way: in practice, when testing a mean of 
the normal distribution using a point-null hypothesis, the probability of that 
hypothesis is zero. This does not imply that it is “absolutely” impossible to state a 
true point-null hypothesis, but that formulated point-nulls in the context of the 
simple normal model are almost surely false. 
Some Implications of the Zero Probability Paradox.  
Fisher’s illuminating words (1922) are more relevant today than in 1922:  
 
It cannot be denied that, during the recent rapid development of 
practical methods, fundamental problems have been ignored and 
fundamental paradoxes left unresolved…This anomalous state of 
statistical science…the obscurity which envelops the theoretical bases 
of statistical methods may perhaps be ascribed to two considerations. 
In the first place, it appears to be widely thought, or rather felt, that in 
a subject in which all results are liable to greater or smaller errors, 
precise definition of ideas or concepts is, if not impossible, at least not 
a practical necessity. In  the  second place, it  has happened that  in  
statistics  a purely verbal  confusion  has hindered  the  distinct 
formulation  of statistical problems. (p. 311-312) 
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We argue that the Zero probability paradox has a specific power to shed new 
light on some fundamental problems in the foundations of statistical science that 
have been ignored, and help us to resolve some accumulated anomalies related to 
the point-null hypothesis testing, including so-called large n problem in 
significance testing, and the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. It can also elucidate the 
notion of the Bayes factor, mixed prior distribution advocated by Jeffreys, 
“irreconcilability of p-values and evidence” (Berger & Sellke, 1987), and 
Cromwell’s rule (Lindley, 1991, p. 104), among others. 
However, detailed consideration of the implications of the Zero probability 
paradox for the Fisherian significance testing, Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, 
and Bayesian testing are beyond the scope of this paper. We confine ourselves, 
therefore, only to some general implications. Berkson (1938) was the first to 
notice dependence of significance testing on the sample size. He objected that it is 
possible to obtain a statistically significant chi-square test merely by increasing 
sample size:  
 
I believe that an observant statistician who has had any considerable 
experience with applying the chi-square test repeatedly will agree with 
my statement that, as a matter of observation, when the numbers in the 
data are quite large, the P's tend to come out small… we have 
something here that is apt to trouble the conscience of a reflective 
statistician using the chi-square test. For I suppose it would be agreed 
by statisticians that a large sample is always better than a small sample. 
If, then, we know in advance the P that will result from an application 
of a chi-square test to a large sample there would seem to be no use in 
doing it on a smaller one. But since the result of the former test is 
known, it is no test at all!” [italicized for emphasis]  
 
Berkson failed to recognize that the same deficiency (sensitivity to sample 
size) is also shared by other significance tests based on point-null hypotheses and 
continuous data. Today this is well known as the large n problem. As argued by 
Mayo (2006, p. 809): “for any discrepancy from the null, however small, one can 
find a sample size such as there is a high probability (as high as one likes) that the 
test will yield a statistically significant result (for any p-value one wishes).” She 
claims that the large n problem is the basis for the famous Jeffreys-Lindley 
paradox (Lindley, 1957), probably the most quoted divergence between the 
frequentist and Bayesian approaches to inference. A number of suggestions have 
been proposed to alleviate this problem, including adjustment of p-values to a 
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fixed sample size (Good, 1988, p. 391), rules of thumb for decreasing α as n 
increases, and indicated effect size. 
Karl Pearson (1935b, p. 550) opined “there is only one case in which an 
hypothesis can be definitely rejected, namely when its probability is zero.” 
Relating this to the Zero probability paradox leads to the following conclusion. 
Focusing on the inferential aspects of the problem (not on the decision-making 
approach) permits rejecting the point-null hypothesis a priori, before seeing data. 
To paraphrase Berkson, because the result of the significance tests are known, 
they are no test at all. Term testing is a misnomer in this case and should be 
replaced by inexactification.  These tests are merely procedures that ask 
researchers to waste their time and financial resources, to collect enough data, and 
when ultimately reject their point nulls to confirm what they knew beforehand, 
that their point nulls were almost surely false. 
Zero probability paradox points to the root cause of the large n problem and 
discloses that there is no cure for it under the current point-null paradigm. 
Because classical significance tests (Z and t-test) are consistent, as the sample size 
increase, they will become extremely sensitive and therefore, detect even the 
tiniest discrepancy from the crisp hypothetical (almost surely false) null 
hypothesis. In other words, classical test statistic converges almost surely to ∞ 
and therefore, gives the asymptotically correct result (see, for example, DasGupta, 
2008, p. 337, or Lehman and Romano, 2005, p. 462). Again, this means that in the 
real world testing any sharp null hypothesis of the normal mean will be ultimately, 
almost surely, rejected with large enough sample size.  
This significant logical inconsistency of the significance testing was not an 
overwhelming issue in the first half of the past century when Gosset was 
“‘naughtily’ playing about with absurdly small numbers” (Eagon Pearson, 1939, p. 
217). However, if Efron’s view (2010, p. VII) is embraced that in the 21st century, 
statisticians will deal with large data sets and complex questions, it is clear that 
the current point-null paradigm is inadequate. Van der Laan and Rose (2010), for 
example, indicated that next generation of statisticians must construct new tools 
for massive data sets since the current ones are severely limited. Similarly, Hand 
(1998, p. 113) insisted in data mining instead of “statistical significance, consider 
more carefully substantive significance: is the effect important or valuable or not?”  
To rephrase Box (1979): the only question of interest is "Is the normal 
model based on point-null hypothesis illuminating and useful?" The answer must 
be “No”. 
So, what should we do? This article is an initial contribution to making a 
paradigm shift in testing statistical hypotheses. Instead of testing highly 
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problematic and almost surely false point null hypotheses, as a natural 
replacement, test a negligible null hypothesis: 
 
0 0:H      (Effect size is negligible) against 
1 0:H      (Effect size is practically meaningful). 
 
We propose naming this avant-garde proposal the “Hodges-Lehmann 
paradigm”. Hodges and Lehmann (1954) were among first statisticians who had 
noted deficiencies of the point null hypothesis and formulated testing of “material 
significance” in their path-breaking paper “Testing the approximate validity of 
statistical hypotheses”. We do not regard the Hodges-Lehmann paradigm as deus 
ex machine, nor as a magic alternative to the traditional point-null testing. 
However, we argue that it will substantially improve scientific research based on 
statistical testing. The argument that point nulls are mathematically more tractable 
is obsolete and belongs to the pre-MCMC era.  
We regard statistics as the grammar of science. Thus, we are responsible for 
providing unambiguous rules of that grammar. We should not feel proud if non-
statisticians are trying to make reform in statistical inference and statistics 
education. We, statisticians, are accountable to provide researchers in other 
sciences non-conflicting, coherent, and consistent concepts of testing the 
statistical hypotheses. Otherwise, significance tests “can actually impede 
scientific progress.” (Kirk, 2003, p. 100) and even harm “development of 
scientific knowledge” (Armstrong, 2007, p. 321). Researchers and scientists will 
feel confused and deceived by statistics and statisticians. As pointed out by 
Cousins (2014, p. 35): “More than a half century after Lindley drew attention to 
the different dependence of p-values and Bayes factors on sample size n 
(described two decades previously by Jeffreys), there is still no consensus on how 
best to communicate results of testing scientific hypotheses.” 
Presumably, we all agree on the point that overcoming of accumulated 
inconsistencies is always a crucial method in science. As pointed out by Good 
(1982, p. 489), “a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise or synthesis is necessary for 
human reasoning.” We argue that this compromise is impossible to reach within 
the point null-hypothesis testing paradigm, as Jeffreys-Lindley paradox evidently 
testifies. 
In sharp contrast to the current point-nulls model, we argue that it is possible 
to harmonize inferential results of frequentist and Bayesian testing within the new 
framework. In other words, frequentist and Bayesian inference will become, in 
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principle, compatible and would (or at least could) lead to the similar conclusions 
in (a) one-sided testing, (b) two-sided testing, and (c) interval estimation. 
However, to make this proposal fully justifiable it is necessary to obtain a 
proof that point nulls are also almost always false in the case of two samples. The 
initial clue is given by Tukey (1991, p. 100): 
 
“Statisticians classically asked the wrong questions—and were willing 
to answer with a lie, one that was often downright lie. They asked 
“Are the effects of A and B different?” and they were willing to 
answer “no.” All we know about the world teaches us that the effects 
of A and B are always different—in some decimal place—for any A 
and B. Thus asking ‘Are the effects different’ is foolish.”  
 
Only then, we can set as one of the fundamental rules of the 21st century 
Statistical Science Decalogue: Hypotheses exactas non fingo! 
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